S26: China Model

• Social movements and collective memory are both rooted in a collective identity.
• Shifts in collective identity can challenge narratives of the past.
• Tiananmen commemoration was supported by a “Hong Kong Chinese” identity.
• With young Hong Kongers rejecting their Chinese identity, they also questioned the relevance of the Tiananmen commemoration to them.

• Jimmy Lai (1947-), a Hong Kong media mogul and democracy advocate, is currently on trial for treason after being held in custody since 2020.
• One of over 250 individuals arrested since 2020 under the NSL, Lai has been denied bail, the right to a jury, and his choice of lawyer.
• Verdict still pending.

• 2020-06-30: National Security Law promulgated.
• 2020-07: 47 activists organized an unofficial primary election to select opposition candidates for the 2020 legislative elections, which were then postponed due to Covid.
• 2021: Hong Kong police charged 47 activists with “subversion” under new national security law.
• 2025-05: 14 pro-democracy activists convicted.

• Banning of public commemoration in Hong Kong after National Security Law
• How to remember Tiananmen when 1) the space for collective memory diminishes; 2) collective identity shifts?

• Parallels: Taiwan’s 228 Incident, Korea’s Kwangju Uprising, and Indonesia’s 1965 Killings.
• Open discussions of these historical events were only made possible after regime changes.
• Meanwhile, memories survived in more virtualized, decentralized, individualized, and internationalized forms.

• Zhao Ziyang had stayed in China
• The students had withdrawn earlier from the Square
• The leaders had been more patient and conciliatory
• The PLA had used non-lethal force
• etc.

Was there a counter-factual history?

• From end of history to authoritarian resilience: How did the CCP survive the end of the Cold War?
• Debates about “China model”: How to understand a rising China?
• Beyond dissidents and loyalists: What are the main intellectual trends in China today?

• Longer in power than the Soviet Union
• Economic performance beats post-socialist regimes (Russia) and developing democracies (e.g. India)
• Popular support

• Direct polls show high support for Xi Jinping (94%) and the government (91%).
• List experiment method (asking respondents how many statements they agree with rather than which ones) lowers support level by nearly 30%.
• College-educated respondents show 10-20% more support for the CCP than those with less education, even in list experiment surveys.

• How did the CCP survive the Cold War?
• Communist resilience does not come from repression alone; it requires continuous adaptive institutional change.

• Economic
• Political
• Institutional
• Ideological legitimation

• State-owned sector restructuring, fiscal recentralization, etc.
• Performance legitimacy

• “Three Represents” (admitting private entrepreneurs into CCP)
• “Socialist harmonious society” and “Common Prosperity” (redistributive policies for “losers” of reform)

• Norm-bound succession politics: Peaceful, orderly transition of power
• Meritocracy, rather than factionalism, as basis of cadre selection and promotion
• Growing institutional complexity, autonomy, and coherence
• New institutions of accountability: Administrative litigation, complaints and petitions, inner-party democracy, etc.

• Ideological commitments to the market (“Development is the only hard truth”)
• Nationalism
• Neo-Confucianism

• Announced during Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” in Jan-Feb 1992
• Markets existed under both socialism and capitalism and therefore not subject to ideological tests
• 1992 party congress: creating a “socialist market economy” as reform objective

Tax reform: Broadening tax base

• Lower and more uniform rates
• Introduction of 17% value-added tax (VAT) and business tax

Recentralization: More revenue for central gov

• Central gov taking larger share than expenditure and redistributing surplus to local govs
• In exchange for fiscal contribution, new freedom for land development and investment
• Control of urban land into developmental resource

• Context: Asian Financial crisis in 1997
• “Safeguard the large firms, let go of the small firms”
• Massive layoffs: and widespread dissatisfaction

• Agreed in Nov 1999 and phasing in after 2001
• WTO membership as complementary to state-sector reforms: Linking up with global norms and regulations to lock in reform achievements
• Foundation for new age of growth: New, mixed corporate economy founded on substantial private ownership
• Global market as new source of demand and economic growth

• Pollution
• Growing inequalities
• Corruption
• Ideological contradictions

Building a centralized system:

• Collective leadership
• Growing institutionalization: Politics contained within certain channels
• Term limit and peaceful transfer of power

• Reform as result of elite concessions: presence of powerful leaders
• Source of dissatisfaction within party
• Difficulty in making tough decisions
• Consistent policy implementation
• Protection of corrupt followers by power brokers

• What are the three mainstream interpretations of China’s rise? What’s wrong with them, according to Qin?
• What is China’s “low human rights advantage”?
• Qin believes China’s development model produces a looping “caterpillar effect”. What is it?
• What kind of change does Qin want for China?
• Do you agree with Qin’s assessment? Why or why not?

• Is there a China model? What is it?
• Is the China model unique? If so, how?
• What can the world learn from China?

• What is the “China system”? How is it different from the “Western system”?
• How could China maintain engagement with the West and “ideational independence”?
• What, according to Pan, explains the rise of nationalism in China since the 1990s?
• Explain the main schools of political thought in contemporary China: neo-leftists, neo-conservatives, etc.