S24: Capitalism without Democracy

History of China Since 1800

March 2, 2026

Reminders

  • Sample final posted
  • Optional review session: March 3, Tuesday 12:15-1:05
  • Final exam: March 6-15, 2026

Music: Teresa Teng

Key questions

Painting over Maoist slogans
  • Growing out of the plan: How did China transition to market economy?
  • “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics”: What is it? Is it a contradiction?
  • Economics and politics: How did they co-evolve?

Sino-Vietnamese War: External Factors

Why did China and Vietnam, two socialist countries, go to war in 1979?

  • Vietnam’s shift in allegiance from China to the Soviet Union: mutual defense treaty in November 1978
  • Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and overthrow of the Khmer Rouge — China’s Maoist ally
  • Fear of Soviet invasion: 1.5 million PLA troops along Chinese-Soviet border
  • Three-way struggle: China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union

Sino-Vietnamese War: Playing the American Card

  • Deng Xiaoping’s meeting with President Jimmy Carter, two weeks before China’s entry to war.
  • Goal: Secure America’s backing and neutralize the Soviet Union’s potential military invasion of China.
  • Appeal to America’s other strategic goals: defeating the Soviet Union, exiting the Vietnam quagmire, and disarming Pyongyang’s nukes.

Sino-Vietnamese War: Internal Factors

Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, and Hua Guofeng
  • Deng Xiaoping sought to consolidate his control over the military.
  • Deng also wished to diminish the power of Hua Guofeng, Mao Zedong’s chosen successor.

Sino-Vietnamese War: China’s Goals

  • Primary goal: not territorial conquest
  • Retaliation against Vietnam while minimizing its exposure to a potential two-front war with both Vietnam and the USSR
  • Demonstration of military strength
  • Realignment with the United States

Sino-Vietnamese War: Outcome for China

Loss

  • Unable to achieve its goal of removing Vietnam from Cambodia, as Vietnam’s occupation lasted until 1989.
  • Heightened Vietnam’s animosity toward China.
  • Peace negotiations between China and Vietnam didn’t occur until 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union.
  • Exposed the PLA’s poor performance

Win

  • Prevented a Soviet invasion from the north due to U.S. support.
  • Helped Deng Xiaoping gain power within the CCP.
  • US Support: establishment of Beijing embassy in 1979, in the middle of the war
  • Prompting a military modernization drive.

Youth: Farewell to Mao

  • What happened to the dance troupe after the Mao era?
  • Who were the “winners” / “losers”? Why?
  • How is the Mao era remembered in China today?

Mao’s China: GDP Compared

Life Expectancy & Infant Mortality Rate: China vs. Developing Asian Economies

GDP per Capita (Current USD): China vs. Developed Asian Countries, 1960-1980

Life Expectancy & Infant Mortality Rate: China vs. Developing Asian Economies

China’s Share of Global GDP (Current USD)

GDP: China vs. Russia (Current USD)

GDP: India vs. China (Current USD)

China in 1978: Under-performer, not a failure

  • Low-income: GDP per capita lower than large sub-Saharan Africa
  • Human development level: Upper-middle-income economy
  • Comprehensive economic infrastructure
  • A country with abundant human resources, but bottled up in countryside
  • (Misguided) capital intense development strategy: heavy industry

Hua vs. Deng

Hua Guofeng

  • 1977-02: “Two whatevers”:
  • “Resolutely defend whatever political decisions taken by Mao”
  • “Unwaveringly follow whatever directives issued by Mao”

Deng Xiaoping

  • 1978-03: “Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth”
  • Transform CCP from revolutionary party to reform-oriented and pragmatic one
  • Four modernizations (of agriculture, industry, science and tech, and defense) as top priority
  • Performance-based legitimacy: Economic development as number one priority

Discuss: Deng Xiaoping on socialism with Chinese characteristics

Herbert Stachelberger, Cycling past Lenin and Stalin posters, 1978
  • How does Deng define socialism and capitalism?
  • How can capitalism change China?
  • How can China change capitalism?

Chicken and egg problem: Origin of development

How can poor and weak societies escape poverty traps? Which comes first – economic growth or good governance?

Modernization theory

  • Growth => Good governance
  • Rising middle class demand greater rights, freedom, and ultimately democracy

Weberian model

  • Rule of law as institutional condition for development
  • World Bank, IMF, etc.: “Get governance right” before markets can grow
  • Max Weber: Professional bureaucracy, specialized and impersonal

Discuss: Advice to Chinese leadership

Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun,Chen Haosu, and Hu Yaobang in 1982
  • What to reform?
  • How to begin?
  • Where to start?

Wanxiang: In the Beginning

  • Who is Lu Guanqiu? How did he start his business career?
  • What was it like to run a business during the Cultural Revolution?
  • What was the business model of Wanxiang’s precursor?

Timeline

Wanxiang

  • 1969: Start-up at the depth of the Cultural Revolution
  • 1977: Access to market; one of three surviving universal-joint producers
  • 1993: Wanxiang America founded

China/Global

  • 1978: Reform era begins
  • 1985: Plaza Accord
  • 2000: Entry to the WTO

Place: Major Cities in Zhejiang

The first windfall

Out of plan:

  • Lu’s village business was excluded from the central economic plan: it can’t easily get raw materials or sell his farm tools.
  • He survived by using scrap steel from nearby villages.

First breakthrough:

  • His high-quality tools was adopted by the municipal farm-tool company in Hangzhou.
  • The government included his factory in the economic plan, granting him steel quotas and market access.
  • By the late 1970s, commitment to quality allowed Wanxiang to survive as one of the only three universal joints makers in China.

Wanxiang’s First Star Product: Universal Joint

Lu Guanqiu focused on producing universal joints (in Chinese, wanxiangjie 萬向節), recognizing market potential from government plans for increased car and truck production.

TVE

  • What is a TVE (township village enterprise)? How is it different from an SOE (state-owned enterprise)?
  • What was the origin of TVEs? How did they evolve?
  • What explains their success?

“Contracting output to households”: In Agriculture

TVE, as a key pillar of China’s rural industrialization, was part of a broader production responsibility system.

  • Gave a household control over a plot of land in return for the delivery of an agreed quantity of grain after harvest
  • This allowed households to effectively rent land from collectives and sell surplus on the market.

“Contracting output to households”

Herbert Stachelberger, Farmers on mule cart, 1978
  • Household contracting of communal land, in return for delivery quota after harvest
  • Reformers: “Renting” land from the collectives
  • Conservatives: Ideologically unacceptable; it would be the end of collective agriculture

Reform without losers

Adrian Bradshaw: A Street Market

Virtuous circle:

  • Production responsibility system
  • Agricultural growth
  • Expansion of labor: Farm households working in non-agriculture, especially TVEs

Shift in developmental strategy:

  • Expanding output while decreasing labor inputs
  • From capital intensive (heavy industry) to labor-intensive development strategy

From rural to urban reform

Rural

  • Household responsibility system: Division of communal land for private cultivation
  • Township and village enterprises (TVE)

Urban

  • Contract responsibility system (1984): autonomy and profits to state-owned enterprises
  • Special economic zones (1980): Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen; further expansion in 1984
  • Dual track approach: State-owned enterprises allowed to sell output exceeding quota at market prices

Dual track economy

Herbert Stachelberger, Street Market, 1978

Co-existence of traditional planned economy and market channel

  • Produce planned output, selling at plan prices
  • Excess sold outside the plan at market prices
  • Reduction of state monopoly enhanced competition
  • Plan and state sector became less dominant elements in economy

Incentivizing growth

Adrian Bradshaw: Government store
  • System of profit retention
  • “Factory manager responsibility system”: managers, not party secretary, given top authority
  • Local gov retention of revenue above control figure
  • Universities and research institutes allowed to set up profit-making subsidiaries
  • Cadre promotion based on local economic and fiscal growth

“Crossing the river by touching the stones”

Herbert Stachelberger, Fishing family, 1978
  • Incremental and improvised, but also broad and bold
  • Top-down direction but also de-centralized improvisation
  • Inflationary economy with shortages => Political backlash

Contract system: Case of Wanxiang

  • Lu Guanqiu pioneered the “contract system” in 1983.
  • He guaranteed fixed annual payments to the village government, with yearly increases.
  • In return, he received exclusive management rights for three years.
  • Factory output significantly increased from RMB 5.5 million (1983) to RMB 19 million (1985).

Wenzhou Model: All Buttoned-up

  • Wenzhou’s economy started with tiny, household-based private ownership.
  • They specialized in common items like buttons and ribbons, filling market gaps.
  • Production was heavily coordinated by markets: Industries formed chains where households specialized in single production stages.
  • Overtime, Wenzhou model led to the development of private banks and real estate firms.

TVE: Impact

TVEs were the most dynamic part of China’s economy from 1978 to the mid-1990s.

Key stats

  • China experienced “miracle growth” of over 10% annually from 1983-1988.
  • TVE employment grew from 28 million in 1978 to 135 million in 1996.
  • This represented a 9% annual growth rate in employment.
  • TVEs’ contribution to GDP increased from less than 6% in 1978 to 26% in 1996.

Behind the numbers:

  • Rural households shifted to production responsibility systems.
  • Mao-era capital-intensive development strategies abandoned: TVEs broke the monopoly of state-owned enterprises in industrial production.
  • Household contracting focused on labor-intensive goods. Previously banned, lower-cost production methods grew rapidly.
  • Overtime, cities absorbed young people into new service and manufacturing jobs.

Explaining TVE’s Success

Factor Description
China’s factor endowment TVEs used abundant labor rather than subsidized capital.
SOEs as rival partners TVEs initially benefited from protected markets and monopoly rents (through contracts from SOEs) but later thrived by filling unmet consumer goods needs and market niches.
A favorable institutional framework local government support, low tax rates, and reinvestment of funds.
Proximity to urban areas Fostered rural industry growth through revived urban-rural linkages, subcontracting, and access to urban resources.
Organizational diversity 2000+ counties, 1 million+ villages in China. Even though a county remained a mini command economy, it was open to competition from thousands of townships and villages, which produced a diversity of business models ranging from government-run to private.

Guangdong Model vs. Zhejiang Model

Guangdong Model

  • TVEs in the Pearl River Delta grew rapidly with foreign investment.
  • Hong Kong and Taiwanese businessmen, with local ties, pioneered these cooperative village businesses.
  • Village leaders managed land, export contracts, and labor.
  • The PRD model was highly open to foreign trade, investment, and workers from elsewhere in China.

Special Economic Zones

SEZs in China, ca 2020
  • Earning foreign exchange and importing foreign technology
  • Foreign firms given concessionary access to long-term land use, tax breaks, and separate legal mandate
  • Local govs given budgetary and policy autonomy

Wanxiang: Other factors of success

Human capital

Wanxiang hired high-school graduates to overcome difficulties in recruiting qualified employees as a TVE.

R&D

Wanxiang invested 5%-7% of its annual revenue in research and development. The “Four Heights” policy was introduced to improve quality through increased investment in technology, better equipment, higher personnel standards, and superior products.

State-business relationship

Despite becoming a private enterprise in 1994, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained influence through key personnel like Lu and his son, and CCP officials in management.

Wanxiang: Going Global

  • Zeller was the first American company to buy Chinese auto parts from Wanxiang in 1984.
  • Wanxiang signed a large supply agreement with Zeller in 1985.
  • But when Zeller demanded exclusive distribution rights, Wanxiang refused.
  • Wanxiang successfully sold its excess products and overcame the hardship.
  • Zeller later renegotiated a new contract of over 1 million with Wanxiang in 1988.
  • In 2000, Wanxiang acquired Zeller Corporation: “earning foreigners’ money, using foreigners’ resources, being foreigners’ bosses, in a foreigners’ land.”

Wanxiang America

  • Who is Ni Pin, Wanxiang’s US CEO?
  • What is Wanxiang America’s business model? How has it evolved?
  • Is Wanxiang American or Chinese?

Wanxiang’s Success: Larger context

  • Rapid growth of auto-industry in China: Surpassed US in sales in 2009
  • Rapid consolidation of US parts company: 50% gone as they were unable to compete in new cost-sensitive market
  • New tech frontier emerging: EVs

Wanxiang America: Localization Strategy

  • Over $1 billion in revenue
  • 4000+ staff, only 15 Chinese employees
  • Big three auto companies as largest consumers
  • Manufacturing moved to China: $0.9/hr wage vs. $22.5/hr (US)
  • Using acquisitions to see which processes could be enhanced and transferred to China
  • Invests in maintaining proprietary technologies in US

Ni Pin on Wanxiang America

Wanxiang: Case Study

  • Successful non-state owned enterprise
  • Family firm, with roots in early rural industrialization
  • A Chinese company’s global strategy: Growth in the US, with limited public opposition

Wanxiang: After the Case

By end of 2007, Wanxiang Group reached ~RMB40 billion in revenues (≈US$5.6B), with Wanxiang America generating over US$1 billion and the Group operating ~20 manufacturing plants across the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Europe. What happened next?

Year Event
2009 Built a large lithium‑ion battery production base (commenced operation by end of 2009) as part of long‑term EV/battery strategy.
2012 Negotiated strategic investment in A123 Systems (initial Aug. 2012 deal), then pursued and won the bankruptcy auction for A123’s assets in Dec. 2012 (deal subject to court/CFIUS review).
2016 Won NDRC approval to build EV production facilities in China (planned capacity: 50,000 EVs/year; project investment ≈US$375M).
2017 Founder Lu Guanqiu died (Oct. 2017); Lu Weiding succeeded as Chairman/CEO and Ni Pin remained a senior executive—Wanxiang continued global EV and clean‑energy initiatives.

Biggest Risk: Future of American Car Industry

Is there a future for a domestic US auto industry? If it continues to decline, what does the future hold for Wanxiang America, especially when US?

Tesla: Half of its Cars are Made in China

How China Became the World’s Largest Car Exporter

Take-away: Decentralized reform

Liu Heung Shing: Man drinking cocoa-cola inside the Forbidden City
  • Center does not dictate actions, but instead authorizes boundaries of local experiments, define and reward success, and encourage mutual exchange.
  • Regional economies (provinces, municiplaities, counties) increasingly competitive; local governments holding responsibility for initiating and coordinating reforms
  • Result: Mixture of top-down direction and bottom-up improvisation.

Take-away: Co-evolution of politics and economics

Adrian Bradshaw: A man shows off a personal cassette player in the street
  • Use weak institutions to build markets
  • Emerging markets stimulate the creation of strong institutions
  • Strong institutions preserve markets

Ni Pin on US-China Relations